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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
 
This is an interlocutory appeal1 from a discovery order of 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania in a suit presenting claims arising under 42 
U.S.C. S 1983, to which are annexed a variety of pendent 
state law claims. The order appealed from granted--subject 
to certain restrictions--plaintiff/appellee Jacqueline 
Pearson's motions to compel discovery. In the same order, 
the District Court denied, to the same extent, motions of 
defendants/appellants Luzerne County Children and Youth 
Services, Inc. (LCCYS) and KidsPeace National Centers for 
Kids in Crisis, Inc. (KidsPeace) which sought protective 
orders authorizing LCCYS and KidsPeace to refrain from 
providing plaintiff with the information sought under 
plaintiff 's motion to compel. 
 
The information at the center of the present discovery 
dispute is information in the possession of LCCYS and 
KidsPeace concerning defendant Bruce Miller, who was a 
foster child under the supervision of LCCYS and KidsPeace 
in December of 1993, when he sexually assaulted Ms. 
Pearson's daughter. Ms. Pearson seeks to establish that the 
defendant agencies had knowledge of Mr. Miller's violent 
sexual propensities sufficient to establish their liability for 
the assault. Ms. Pearson thus seeks discovery of material 
that might evidence such knowledge. LCCYS and KidsPeace 
have resisted plaintiff 's discovery requests on the grounds 
that such discovery would violate the confidentiality of that 
information in breach of an array of Pennsylvania statutes. 
 
Primarily on the basis of an "Authorization to Release 
Information" signed by Mr. Miller, the District Court 
rejected the argument of LCCYS and KidsPeace that the 
Pennsylvania statutes barred the sought after discovery. 
The court held that, subject to certain restrictions 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because interlocutory appeals are not normally permitted, a 
discussion of the basis of our appellate jurisdiction is necessary. We 
undertake that discussion in Section II, infra . 
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necessary to protect other people's interests, Mr. Miller's 
release was sufficient to waive the bulk of the protections 
afforded by the Pennsylvania statutes. The District Court 
thus fashioned an order that compelled discovery of all 
material sought except to the extent that such material 
contained information the release of which would violate 
the rights of third parties protected by the Pennsylvania 
statutes, as those statutes were interpreted by the District 
Court. 
 
Because, however, discovery disputes in federal courts 
are governed by federal law, especially the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, the state 
statutory confidentiality provisions that have been invoked 
by appellants--and on the basis of which the District Court 
fashioned its order--do not directly govern the present 
dispute. Only to the extent that federal law may recognize 
the force of those provisions are they relevant here. The 
ultimate issue is whether the discovery sought is permitted 
as a matter of federal law. 
 
Acknowledging the applicability of federal law, appellants 
contend that the state confidentiality provisions ought to be 
recognized under the federal law of evidentiary privileges. 
We are thus directed to the question whether the 
applicability of the federal law governing discovery disputes 
bars the release of the demanded information either--as 
appellants have chiefly argued--because federal law 
recognizes one or more applicable evidentiary privileges, or 
because federal law otherwise provides for the protection of 
the information here in dispute. 
 
For the reasons discussed below, we reject appellants' 
argument that the disputed material is protected by a 
federal evidentiary privilege. While we accept that 
appellants may have very legitimate concerns regarding the 
confidentiality of the information sought, we believe that 
those concerns are better addressed in the context of the 
District Court's power to impose reasonable limits on the 
discovery of sensitive information pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 26(c). To enable the District Court to 
fashion the appropriate accommodation of the competing 
interests, we will vacate the order appealed from and 
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remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
I. 
 
The facts relevant to the resolution of the issue before 
this court are largely undisputed. Plaintiff Jacqueline 
Pearson--appellee in this court--brought this action on her 
own behalf and as parent of her daughter Lindsay Pearson. 
Ms. Pearson alleges, and appellants do not contest, that 
defendant Bruce Miller abducted and sexually assaulted 
twelve-year-old Lindsay on December 19, 1993. Mr. Miller 
was, at the time of the assault and for the previous ten 
months, living in a foster home in Luzerne County, 
Pennsylvania. He was under the custody and supervision of 
LCCYS, a county government agency, as he had been for 
the previous several years. Mr. Miller was placed in the 
particular foster home in which he lived by KidsPeace, a 
private organization under contract with LCCYS to provide 
services to LCCYS's clients. Beyond this general 
characterization, it is unclear how Mr. Miller's supervision 
was divided between the two organizations. 
 
Following the attack, a criminal rape charge was brought 
against Mr. Miller. He pled nolo contendere to the charge, 
and was sentenced to five to ten years in prison. As far as 
we are aware, he is currently serving that sentence. 
 
Ms. Pearson initiated the present action against Mr. 
Miller and appellant LCCYS in December of 1995 in the 
Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. 
Thereafter, LCCYS removed the case to the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 
LCCYS then brought in appellant KidsPeace as a third- 
party defendant. Ms. Pearson then amended her complaint 
to assert claims against both agencies. 
 
Ms. Pearson's primary cause of action against appellants 
is a S 1983 claim alleging that they are liable for the 
consequences of a "state-created danger." In particular, 
appellee Pearson alleges that appellants knew Mr. Miller to 
have had violent sexual propensities that made him a 
predictable danger to young girls. In light of this knowledge, 
appellee contends that Mr. Miller "should not have been 
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allowed access to young girls such as he gained by his 
foster care placement, by being permitted to attend public 
school, and by being allowed to ride a school bus on his 
own." In addition to her S 1983 claim, appellee's second 
amended complaint includes federal equal protection and 
common law negligence and invasion of privacy claims 
against appellants, as well as a prayer for punitive 
damages. On July 10, 1998, the District Court dismissed 
with prejudice, as against LCCYS only, Ms. Pearson's state 
law claims, as well as all claims for punitive damages. 
Thus, appellee's remaining claims against LCCYS are 
limited to federal ones; as against KidsPeace, on the other 
hand, the above-noted state law claims remain in the case 
together with the federal claims. 
 
During the discovery period, Ms. Pearson filed notices of 
deposition directed to both appellants announcing an 
intention to depose "all case managers and their 
supervisors who had responsibility for the management and 
supervision of Bruce Miller for the five (5) years prior to 
December 17, 1993." Soon thereafter, plaintiff served 
interrogatories on LCCYS and KidsPeace that included 
requests for information which--so both appellants contend 
--would require the release of sensitive confidential 
information contained in their respective files on Bruce 
Miller. In order to avoid that perceived outcome, KidsPeace 
and LCCYS filed motions for protective orders seeking 
protection from each of these requests. Appellee responded 
by filing a motion to compel discovery of the disputed 
material. 
 
After appellants had filed their motions for protective 
orders, but prior to the filing of the motion to compel, Ms. 
Pearson's attorneys obtained an "Authorization to Release 
Records" signed by Bruce Miller. Mr. Miller had, by that 
time, reached majority, and was acting as his own attorney. 
The text of that document is as follows: 
 
       I, BRUCE MILLER, hereby authorize Luzerne County 
       Children and Youth Services and/or KidsPeace 
       National Centers for Kids in Crisis, Inc. to release my 
       entire file, including, but not limited to, any and all 
       evaluations, memoranda, correspondence, personal 
       data, recommendations and requests to Chester 
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       Dudick, Jr. Esquire and Richard M. Hughes, III, 
       Esquire. 
 
Appellants sought protection from discovery on the basis 
of the confidentiality provisions contained in three statutes: 
 
The first statute, the Child Protective Services Law 
(CPSL), 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 6301 et seq., mandates that 
the confidentiality of reports of child abuse made pursuant 
to that law be preserved. It provides that such reports are 
to be made available only to a limited number of persons, 
among whom are the subject of any report and a guardian 
ad litem of the child.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The arguably relevant exceptions to the general rule of confidentiality 
are contained in 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 6340: 
 
(a) General rule.--Reports specified in sectio n 6339 (relating to 
confidentiality of reports) shall only be made available to: 
 
       . . . . 
 
       (3) A guardian ad litem or court designated advoca te for the 
child. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       (5) A court of competent jurisdiction, 8 pursuant to court order or 
       subpoena in a criminal matter involving a charge of child abuse 
       . . . . 
 
       (5.1) A court of common pleas in connection with any matter 
       involving custody of a child. . . . 
 
       . . . . 
 
       (b) Release of information to subject of report.--At any time and 
       upon written request, a subject of a report may receive a copy of 
all 
       information, except that prohibited from being disclosed by 
       subsection (c), contained in the Statewide central register or in 
any 
       report filed pursuant to section 6313 (relating to reporting 
       procedure). 
 
       (c) Protecting identity of person making report.--Except for 
reports 
       pursuant to subsection (a)(9) and (10), the release of data that 
       would identify the person who made a report of suspected child 
       abuse or the person who cooperated in a subsequent investigation 
       is prohibited unless the secretary finds that the release will not 
be 
       detrimental to the safety of that person. Law enforcement officials 
       shall treat all reporting sources as confidential sources. 
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The second statute, the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
S 6501 et seq., restricts access to "files and records of the 
court" related to proceedings under the Act, which include 
custody disputes, delinquency proceedings, et cetera. Such 
files are to be kept confidential, except that certain 
excepted persons, including parties "and their counsel and 
representatives" are permitted to view the documents 
contained therein. Even those granted access by an 
exception to the general confidentiality rule, however, "shall 
not be permitted to see reports revealing the names of 
confidential sources of information contained in social 
reports, except at the discretion of the court." 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. S 6307(2). 
 
The third statute invoked by appellants is the Mental 
Health Procedures Act (MHPA), 50 Pa. Cons. Stat.S 7101 et 
seq. That statute directs that "[a]ll documents concerning 
persons in treatment shall be kept confidential." 50 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 7111(a).3 Such documents may be 
released only by the consent of the subject, or in other 
limited circumstances.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In pertinent part, the MHPA provides that: 
 
       (a) All documents concerning persons in treatment shall be kept 
       confidential and, without the person's written consent, may not be 
       released or their contents disclosed to anyone except: 
 
       (1) those engaged in providing treatment for the p erson; 
 
       (2) the county administrator, pursuant to section 110; 
 
       (3) a court in the course of legal proceedings aut horized by this 
       act; and 
 
       (4) pursuant to Federal rules, statutes and regula tions governing 
       disclosure of patient information where treatment is undertaken 
       in a Federal agency. 
 
       In no event, however, shall privileged communications, whether 
       written or oral, be disclosed to anyone without such written 
consent. 
 
50 Pa. C.S.A. S 7111. 
4. Appellants also sought protection under the County Youth Services 
Law, 55 Pa. Code S 3130 et seq., a regulation that governs county youth 
services agencies, such as LCCYS. The law contains, inter alia, 
requirements that such agencies maintain the confidentiality of their 
records. Because these requirements are broadly similar to those 
contained in the CPSL, we will, for the most part, restrict our discussion 
to the three statutes noted above. 
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The District Court rejected the appellants' contention 
that these statutes together created a comprehensive shield 
protecting most, if not all, of the information held by the 
two organizations concerning Mr. Miller. The court did so 
on the basis of its view that the release signed by Mr. Miller 
was sufficient to waive the bulk of the confidentiality 
protections contemplated by the statutes. The District 
Court accepted that the statutes--including the 
confidentiality provisions therein--were, in thefirst 
instance, applicable to the dispute at hand, but held that 
Mr. Miller had effectively waived his interests in protection, 
thus allowing the bulk of the material to be turned over, 
subject to limited restrictions primarily aimed at the 
protection of other people whose privacy interests might be 
compromised by the unhindered release of the information.5 
 
II. 
 
Before we turn to the merits of this discovery dispute, we 
are faced with the issue of appellate jurisdiction. The 
District Court had original federal question jurisdiction of 
this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331. This case comes to 
this court, however, as an interlocutory appeal of a 
discovery order. "As a general rule, a district court's order 
enforcing a discovery request is not a `final order' subject to 
appellate review." Church of Scientology v. United States, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The District Court imposed the following restrictions: 
 
       a. In accordance with section 6307(2) of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa. 
       Cons. Stat. S 6303-6365 (1982 & Supp. 1998), neither Mr. Miller 
       nor his counsel or representative may see any courtfiles or 
       records of Juvenile Act proceedings which contain the names of 
       confidential sources of information. 
 
       b. Pursuant to 55 Pa. Code S 3680.35(b)(5), defendants shall redact 
       the names and other identifying information of individuals other 
       than Mr. Miller, when the disclosure of such information would 
       violate the legitimate privacy expectations of any individual other 
       than Mr. Miller. 
 
       c. It is further ordered that plaintiff shall maintain as 
confidential 
       all documents received from defendants. 
 
Pearson v. Miller, No. 97-764 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 1998). 
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506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 (1992). This court has jurisdiction over 
this appeal, therefore, only if it fits within one of the 
exceptions to that general rule. Because we find that the 
present case fits within the collateral order doctrine--the 
exception to the final order rule which the Supreme Court 
fashioned in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 
541(1949)--we hold that we properly have jurisdiction over 
the appeal. This court has interpreted the Cohen  test as 
follows: 
 
       An appeal of a nonfinal order will lie if (1) the order 
       from which the appellant appeals conclusively 
       determines the disputed question; (2) the order resolves 
       an important issue that is completely separate from the 
       merits of the dispute; and (3) the order is effectively 
       unreviewable on appeal from the judgment. 
 
In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 958 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
In Ford, this court held that an appeal from a denial of 
the application of the attorney-client privilege was 
reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. See Ford, 
110 F.3d at 964. For similar reasons, we find that each of 
the requirements of the test is met in the present case. An 
order denying the applicability of a claimed privilege 
conclusively determines the question, and does so in a way 
that is effectively unreviewable: once released, information 
has lost a measure of confidentiality that can never fully be 
regained. See id. at 963. Further, it is clear that resolution 
of the present issue in this forum--which concerns only the 
scope of state or federal privileges--would not require the 
court to delve into the substance of the underlying dispute 
--which concerns appellants' knowledge of Mr. Miller's 
violent sexual proclivities--in any apparent way. And it is 
beyond dispute that the issue in the present action is an 
important one. Cf. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996) 
(granting certiorari on the question whether federal law 
recognizes a psychotherapist-patient privilege, in part 
because of "the importance of the question"). Thus, the 
order appealed from "resolves an important issue that is 
completely separate from the merits of the dispute." Ford, 
110 F.3d at 958. 
 
Having found that each of the requirements of the 
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collateral order exception to the final order doctrine 
obtains, we now turn to the merits of the discovery dispute.6 
 
III. 
 
The general framework for determining the scope of 
allowable discovery for cases in federal courts is provided 
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which provides that 
"parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved 
in the pending action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). As an initial 
matter, therefore, all relevant material is discoverable 
unless an applicable evidentiary privilege is asserted. The 
presumption that such matter is discoverable, however, is 
defeasible. Rule 26(c) grants federal judges the discretion to 
issue protective orders that impose restrictions on the 
extent and manner of discovery where necessary "to protect 
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression, or undue burden or expense." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(c). 
 
Rule 26 thus allows for two approaches to seeking the 
protection of sensitive--but relevant--information, like that 
at issue here. A party seeking to protect the confidentiality 
of such information may argue, as appellants have here, 
that the information is protected by an evidentiary privilege. 
Any material covered by a properly asserted privilege would 
necessarily be protected from discovery, pursuant to Rule 
26(b)(1). Where such a privilege is not available, a party 
may petition the court for a protective order that limits 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Because the order appealed from concerns claims of privilege, our 
conclusion that, pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, we have 
appellate jurisdiction to review that order is in harmony with our 
decision just a few days ago in Bacher v. Allstate Insurance Company, 
No. 99-1572 (April 20, 2000). In Bacher we dismissed an appeal from a 
discovery order requiring a defendant insurance carrier to disclose 
amounts paid in settlement of other assertedly similar lawsuits. We there 
held that, "[i]n light of Cunningham[v. Hamilton County, 119 S.Ct. 1915 
(1999)] and Digital Equipment [v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 
(1994)] and the approach taken by other courts of appeals we determine 
that we should not extend our case law beyond the narrow categories of 
trade secrets and traditionally recognized privileges, such as attorney- 
client and work product." 
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discovery in accordance with Rule 26(c). The court, in its 
discretion, is authorized by this subsection to fashion a set 
of limitations that allows as much relevant material to be 
discovered as possible, while preventing unnecessary 
intrusions into the legitimate interests--including privacy 
and other confidentiality interests--that might be harmed 
by the release of the material sought. 
 
Appellants, in this court, have primarily pursued the 
approach of seeking the protection of an evidentiary 
privilege. Thus, while acknowledging that the District Court 
erred in applying state law directly, they argue that, as a 
matter of federal law, the concerns captured by the 
Commonwealth's confidentiality statutes ought to be 
reflected in federal recognition of an evidentiary privilege 
that would allow appellants to properly resist all, or nearly 
all, of the discovery attempted by appellee. We therefore 
turn first to appellants' claim that the material sought is 
protected by an evidentiary privilege under federal law. 
 
a. 
 
All evidentiary privileges asserted in federal court are 
governed, in the first instance, by Federal Rule of Evidence 
501, which provides: 
 
       [T]he privilege of a witness, person, government, State, 
       or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the 
       principles of the common law as they may be 
       interpreted by the courts of the United States in the 
       light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions 
       and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim 
       or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of 
       decision, the privilege of a witness, person, 
       government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall 
       be determined in accordance with State law. 
 
Thus, federal courts are to apply federal law of privilege 
to all elements of claims except those "as to which State 
law supplies the rule of decision." In general, federal 
privileges apply to federal law claims, and state privileges 
apply to claims arising under state law. The present case, 
however, presents the complexity of having both federal and 
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state law claims in the same action.7 The problems 
associated with the application of two separate privilege 
rules in the same case are readily apparent, especially 
where, as here, the evidence in dispute is apparently 
relevant to both the state and the federal claims. This court 
has resolved this potential conflict in favor of federal 
privilege law. Noting that "applying two separate disclosure 
rules with respect to different claims tried to the same jury 
would be unworkable," we held that "when there are federal 
law claims in a case also presenting state law claims, the 
federal rule favoring admissibility, rather than any state law 
privilege, is the controlling rule." Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. 
General Nutrition Corp., 671 F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 1982).8 
Accordingly, for the resolution of the present discovery 
dispute, which concerns material relevant to both federal 
and state claims, Rule 501 directs us to apply federal 
privilege law. 
 
Federal privilege law, as conceived by Rule 501, is 
determined by "the principles of common law as they may 
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light 
of reason and experience." No decisions of this court have, 
as a matter of federal common law, recognized privileges of 
the sort contemplated by the CPSL, the Juvenile Act, or the 
MHPA. And so far as we have been able to determine, none 
of our sister circuits has recognized cognate privileges as a 
matter of federal common law. Thus, appellants are 
effectively requesting that we recognize quite novel 
privileges as part of the federal common law.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. As discussed above, both federal and state claims remain in the case 
against KidsPeace, while each of the remaining claims against LCCYS is 
federal. 
 
8. Here, as in Thompson, the disputed discovery material is relevant to 
both the state and federal claims. We thus need not reach the question 
of whether material that went only to the state claims would be 
controlled by federal law simply because distinct federal claims had also 
been raised. But see Doe v. Special Investigations Agency, Inc., 779 F. 
Supp. 21 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that federal law governs all privilege 
questions in cases in which a federal claim has been raised, without 
regard to whether the privilege sought would protect information relevant 
to the federal claims). 
 
9. It should be noted that one district court has recognized a privilege 
of 
the kind here sought. That court adopted a Rule 501 privilege protecting 
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The federal approach to the recognition of new privileges 
is characterized by two principal features. First,"Rule 501 
`should be understood as reflecting the view that the 
recognition of a privilege based on a confidential 
relationship . . . should be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.' " Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) 
(recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege under Rule 
501). "Congress manifested an affirmative intention not to 
freeze the law of privilege. Its purpose rather was to `provide 
the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on 
a case-by-case basis,' 120 Cong. Rec. 40891 (1974) 
(statement of Rep. Hungate), and to leave the door open to 
change." Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980); 
see also In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1149 (3d Cir. 
1997). The general test to be applied in assessing privilege 
candidates is whether such a privilege "promotes 
sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for 
probative evidence." Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51; Jaffee, 518 
U.S. at 9-10. 
 
The other principal feature of the federal approach is that 
the considerations against the recognition of new privileges 
that would impede access to probative evidence are granted 
very significant weight. " `For more than three centuries it 
has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the 
public . . . has a right to every man's evidence. When we 
come to examine the various claims of exemption, we start 
with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to 
give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any 
exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional.' " 
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9 (quoting 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the confidentiality of child abuse reports whose confidentiality is 
protected by Tennessee's analog to the CPSL. See Farley v. Farley, 952 
F. Supp. 1232 (M.D. Tenn. 1997) ("This Court has little difficulty in 
concluding the T.C.A. SS 37-1-409 and 37-1-612 establish an evidentiary 
privilege that is entitled to deference under the principles of federalism 
and comity that are an implicit component of Rule 501."). 
 
On the other hand, a district court in this circuit has expressly 
rejected the privilege here sought under the Juvenile Act. See 
Longenbach v. McGonigle, 750 F. Supp. 178, 180 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("We 
know of no common law federal privilege against disclosing juvenile 
records."). 
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S 2192, p. 64 (3d ed. 1940)). This court has recently stated 
that "privileges are disfavored." In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 
at 1149 (rejecting parent-child privilege); see also Nixon, 
418 U.S. at 710 (cautioning that privileges "are not lightly 
created nor expansively construed"). Thus, with very limited 
exceptions, federal courts have generally declined to grant 
requests for new privileges. See, e.g. , University of 
Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (declining 
to adopt academic peer-review privilege); In re Sealed Case, 
148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir.) (declining to adopt "protective 
function" privilege requested by the Secret Service), cert. 
denied, Rubin v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998); 
Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 794 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (rejecting a corporate ombudsman privilege and 
stating that "[t]he creation of a wholly new evidentiary 
privilege is a big step"); Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & 
Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 5 F.3d 1508, 1514 
(D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Federal courts have never recognized an 
insured-insurer privilege as such."); EEOC v. Illinois Dept. of 
Employment Sec., 995 F.2d 106 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting 
Rule 501 privilege for records of unemployment hearings); 
United States v. Holmes, 594 F.2d 1167 (8th Cir. 1979) 
(declining to recognize probation officer privilege). Thus, 
federal courts are to assess the appropriateness of new 
privileges as they arise in particular cases, but they are to 
conduct that assessment with a recognition that only the 
most compelling candidates will overcome the law's weighty 
dependence on the availability of relevant evidence. 
 
The case for recognizing a particular federal privilege is 
stronger, however, where the information sought is 
protected by a state privilege. "[T]he policy decisions of the 
States bear on the question whether federal courts should 
recognize a new privilege or amend the coverage of an 
existing one." Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12-13."A strong policy of 
comity between state and federal sovereignties impels 
federal courts to recognize state privileges where this can 
be accomplished at no substantial cost to federal 
substantive and procedural policy." United States v. King, 
73 F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); see also Memorial 
Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 (7th Cir. 1981); Lora 
v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Johnson 
v. City of Philadelphia, 1994 WL 612785, at *10 (E.D. Pa. 
 
                                15 
  
Nov. 7, 1994). Thus, a federal court "may seefit for special 
reasons to give the law of a particular state highly 
persuasive or even controlling effect, but in the last 
analysis its decision turns upon the law of the United 
States, not that of any state." Riley v. City of Chester, 612 
F.2d 708, 715 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting D'Oench, Duhme & 
Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 471 (1942)) (emphasis omitted). 
 
The appropriateness of deference to a state's law of 
privilege is diminished, however, in cases in which a 
defendant state actor alleged to have violated citizens' 
federal rights is asserting the privilege. "[T]here is a `special 
danger' in permitting state governments to define the scope 
of their own privilege when the misconduct of their agents 
is alleged." ACLU v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. 
1981); see also Longenbach, 750 F. Supp. at 180-81 ("Nor 
does it make any sense to allow the state, under whose 
color of authority officers have allegedly violated rights, to 
limit unilaterally the availability of evidence.").10 
 
Appellants have urged that the appropriate level of 
respect due to state law in the present case requires that 
the Pennsylvania privileges be recognized as a matter of 
federal law. A necessary predicate of appellants' favored 
outcome, of course, is that Pennsylvania in fact recognizes 
evidentiary privileges associated with the statutes in 
question. As an initial matter, however, it is not clear that 
the statutes in question create evidentiary privileges at all. 
Indeed, neither the CPSL nor the Juvenile Act contains the 
word "privilege."11 The relevant provisions contained therein 
speak primarily of confidentiality, not privilege. On their 
face, therefore, these statutes do not appear to establish 
evidentiary privileges constituting a bar to the discovery of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. This concern is especially strong where, as here, a government 
agency asserting the privilege is itself a defendant (as distinct from 
being 
the employer of a defendant governmental official). 
 
11. The MHPA, on the other hand, does use the word "privilege." 
However, the language containing that word does not, on its face, create 
a privilege. Following the statute's language mandating confidentiality, 
it 
refers to "privileged communications," but does so in a way that suggests 
that the privilege must be defined elsewhere:"In no event, however, shall 
privileged communications, whether written or oral, be disclosed to 
anyone without such written consent." 50 Pa. St.S 7111(a). 
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relevant information. Statutory provisions providing for 
duties of confidentiality do not automatically imply the 
creation of evidentiary privileges binding on courts. "Merely 
asserting that a state statute declares that the records in 
question are `confidential' does not make out a sufficient 
claim that the records are `privileged' within the meaning of 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) and Fed R. Evid. 501." Martin v. 
Lamb, 122 F.R.D. 143, 146 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); see also 
Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1205 (9th Cir. 
1975) ("The records are confidential but not privileged."). 
 
It does not follow, however, that a statute providing for a 
duty of confidentiality--but lacking an express provision for 
an evidentiary privilege, per se--could not also be 
interpreted as creating such a privilege. Indeed, 
Pennsylvania courts have described each of the statutes 
here at issue as creating an evidentiary privilege of one 
kind or another. See Commonwealth v. Moyer, 595 A.2d 
1177, 1180 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) ("[T]hefirst sentence of 
[section 7111 of the MHPA] confers a statutory privilege of 
confidentiality on the patient's records."); 12 V.B.T. v. Family 
Servs., 705 A.2d 1325, 1334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (noting 
that the CPSL creates a privilege, albeit one that is "not 
absolute and disclosure of otherwise confidential 
information is therefore permitted where compelled by 
sufficiently weighty interests") (citing Commonwealth v. 
Ritchie, 502 A.2d 148 (Pa. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 
480 U.S. 39 (1987)); id. at 1331 ("[T]he privilege created by 
the Juvenile Act is qualified, i.e., creates, by its own terms, 
exceptions to the confidentiality of juvenile court records."). 
 
To be sure, what these opinions have characterized as 
"privileges" are not necessarily privileges within the 
meaning of Rule 501. It is clear, however, that the 
Commonwealth does recognize a series of rights, variously 
defined, to withhold relevant evidence from judicial 
proceedings on the basis of the confidentiality provisions 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. This court, following Moyer, has reached a similar conclusion with 
respect to Pennsylvania law. See Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 
F.3d 456, 465 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that the MHPA"presents an 
absolute confidentiality privilege against the disclosure of documents 
that `concern[ ] persons in treatment' "). 
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contained in the Pennsylvania statutes. Considerations of 
comity require that we at least consider these "privileges," 
as well as the confidentiality interests otherwise protected 
under the laws of the Commonwealth, although our 
ultimate task remains the determination of the issue of 
whether privileges associated with these statutes and the 
confidentiality that they seek to protect are cognizable 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 501.13 
 
In sum, we must determine whether to recognize a 
federal privilege that would allow the evidence here sought 
to be kept from appellee, notwithstanding its relevance. We 
are, in essence, to determine whether there are federal law 
privileges that amount to parallels of the state law 
privileges that appellants have argued would bar the 
discovery here sought, had the present suit been brought in 
the courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Thus, we 
are to determine, granting due respect to Pennsylvania's 
protections, whether a privilege of the kind sought by 
appellants "promotes sufficiently important interests to 
outweigh the need for probative evidence," Trammel, 445 
U.S. at 5, where the need for probative evidence is viewed 
as a very weighty consideration indeed--to the extent that 
only the strongest considerations on the other side of the 
scale are capable of outweighing it. 
 
b. 
 
With that framework in place, we turn to the particular 
privileges sought by appellants. As we discuss below, we 
will decline to recognize any of the privileges under which 
appellants have sought protection from discovery. Because 
of the particular circumstances of this case, in which Mr. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. This approach is consistent with that employed in Jaffee. The Court 
there based its decision to recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege 
in part on the fact that all fifty states had done so. And while the 
majority of the statutes cited in support of this proposition expressly 
create such a privilege, not all of them do so. For example, the Rhode 
Island statute cited, R.I. Gen. Laws. SS 5-37.3-3 and -4, speaks only of 
confidentiality. Like the statutes at issue here, however, the Rhode 
Island statute has been interpreted by its courts as creating a privilege. 
See Lewis v. Roderick, 617 A.2d 119, 121 (R.I. 1992). 
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Miller has waived assertion of his confidentiality interests, 
in order for appellants to be protected by such a privilege, 
it would have to be a privilege of a very unusual sort--one 
whose breadth and scope would appear to make it 
particularly unsuited for recognition within the framework 
of Rule 501. This conclusion is only strengthened by our 
view, discussed in the next section, that a far more 
appropriate mechanism exists for protecting the legitimate 
interests at stake: namely, a Rule 26(c) protective order. In 
light of the disfavor with which federal law looks upon new 
privileges, these considerations are sufficient to provide a 
basis for the rejection of appellants' proposed privileges. 
 
Because Mr. Miller has effectively waived his 
confidentiality interests, appellants have been forced to 
invoke privileges directed entirely at interests other than 
those of Mr. Miller.14 Thus, the question presented is not 
whether there are evidentiary privileges protecting Mr. 
Miller's interests under Rule 501, but whether federal law 
is to recognize one or more privileges directed at the 
interests of third parties whose interests may be affected by 
the release of the information here in dispute. Because the 
primary interests at stake--Mr. Miller's--have been taken 
off of the table, the privileges sought by the appellants must 
necessarily focus on the secondary interests at stake. 
 
Once our inquiry is confined to the consideration of 
potential privileges characterized in that way, it is clear that 
appellants' requested privileges must be rejected. We 
consider first appellants' invocation of the Mental Health 
Procedures Act. It is settled under Pennsylvania law that 
the MHPA gives rise to "an absolute confidentiality 
privilege" covering documents related to the treatment of 
mental health problems. Hahnemann, 74 F.3d at 465; see 
also Moyer, 595 A.2d at 1180. That privilege, however, is 
held by the patient, who is permitted to waive it and to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Appellants have suggested that the validity of the waiver signed by 
Mr. Miller is in question. They point to nothing in the record, however, 
that casts even the smallest amount of doubt on its authenticity. We 
find, therefore, as a matter of law, that Mr. Miller has waived his rights 
in the confidentiality of the materials here sought to the extent 
permitted 
by law. 
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allow the protected information to be released. See Sprague 
v. Walter, 656 A.2d 890, 910-911 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) 
(finding the MHPA privilege to have been waived by former 
patient who had allowed records to become publicly 
available). It follows that any privilege that would spring 
from the MHPA in the present case would necessarily have 
been waived by Mr. Miller's release. 
 
Notably, federal law does recognize a privilege that would 
seem to overlap the privilege under the MHPA: the 
psychotherapist privilege. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15. Again, 
like that associated with the MHPA, the federal 
psychotherapist privilege is owned by--and fully waivable 
by--the patient. See id. at 15 n.14. Thus, any such 
privilege could not provide the basis for the protection here 
sought, because if such a privilege did protect any of the 
information at issue, Mr. Miller would be deemed to have 
effectively waived that protection. 
 
The privileges associated with the Child Protective 
Services Law and Juvenile Act are not so readily 
dismissible. For with respect to those statutes, protecting 
third-party interests is undoubtedly an important 
ingrediant of the confidentiality provisions. The CPSL's 
confidentiality provision, for instance, is directed at the 
confidentiality interests not only of the child, but also of 
those who file child abuse reports, of those who work with 
the child, and, perhaps, of the state agencies themselves.15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has stated that: 
 
       The confidentiality provisions of the CPSL have several clear 
       functions in light of the statute's broad purposes: to encourage 
       reporting of abuse by ensuring that persons with knowledge of 
       abuse are not deterred from reporting it by the prospect of the 
       abuser learning their identity and seeking retribution; to 
facilitate 
       the investigation of abuse by assuring potential witnesses that the 
       information they provide to investigators will not be made public; 
to 
       facilitate the rehabilitation and treatment of abused children and 
       their families by encouraging open, frank communications with 
       agency personnel and treatment providers; to encourage the 
effective 
       operation of the child protective service by enabling it to keep 
       complete and comprehensive files on all aspects of a family's 
       circumstances without fear that information placed in such files 
will 
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There is little question that many of these interests are of 
very substantial weight. Indeed, it is difficult to overstate 
the importance of a state's activities directed at the welfare 
of children. And the prevention and detection of child abuse 
are among the most compelling of these activities. The need 
to protect the confidence of the children involved in these 
programs and proceedings is crucial to their maximal 
effectiveness. Additionally, the importance of protecting 
those who file child abuse reports is clear. It is essential 
that people be encouraged to make such reports, and 
confidentiality is a valuable tool to that end."Recognizing 
this, the Commonwealth--like all other States--has made a 
commendable effort to assure victims and witnesses that 
they may speak to the CYS counselors without fear of 
general disclosure." Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60-61; see also 
Farley, 952 F. Supp. at 1240 ("Without question, the 
investigation and resolution of incidents of child abuse is 
one of the most important regulatory objectives that a state 
may undertake."). 
 
Thus, in addition to the interests of the child, it is evident 
that a large number of persons have significant interests in 
maintaining the confidentiality of the kinds of records here 
sought. If we were to recognize a privilege that protected all 
of the interests at which the confidentiality provisions of the 
Pennsylvania statutes are directed, Mr. Miller's waiver 
would not be adequate to waive the privilege in its entirety. 
 
However, the same factor that would allow these 
privileges to survive Mr. Miller's waiver--the number and 
variety of interests that appellants would have us hold to be 
a basis for such privileges--makes them poor candidates 
for the protection of a Rule 501 privilege. Initially, we note 
that such a privilege would be unlike any currently 
recognized Rule 501 privilege. As a general matter, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       be subject to scrutiny by persons not involved in the process of 
       rehabilitating the family; and to prevent the innocent victims of 
       abuse from also becoming victims of public stigma by guarding 
       information about the intimate details of their lives from the 
prying 
       eyes of outsiders. 
 
V.B.T., 705 A.2d 1325, 1335-36. 
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privileges are ordinarily found in bilateral confidential 
relations: attorney-client, husband-wife, clergy- 
communicator, reporter-source, government-informer. And, 
of course, the privilege most recently recognized by the 
Supreme Court, the psychotherapist-patient privilege 
recognized in Jaffee, fits this standard schema. 
 
There is good reason for favoring relatively uncomplicated 
confidential relationships in assessing candidates for the 
application of evidentiary privileges as contemplated by 
Rule 501. Complex multilateral privileges such as the ones 
here sought would necessarily be extremely broad and 
unwieldy to enforce. We might, for instance, recognize such 
a privilege held by all of those with significant interests in 
confidentiality. Presumably, however, it would follow that 
the privilege could not be waived without the consent of all 
the potentially vast number of "holders" of the privilege. 
Such a privilege would essentially be unwaivable. Indeed, it 
is far from clear that such a protection would appropriately 
be labeled a "privilege," in the sense employed in Rule 501, 
at all. Cf. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15 n.14 ("Like other 
testimonial privileges, the patient may of course waive the 
protection."). 
 
We might, on the other hand, view such a privilege as 
held by the state on behalf of all of those who have 
interests in confidentiality under the statutes. While such a 
solution would have certain practical advantages over the 
"privilege" just described, it would remain a poor fit for the 
framework of Rule 501. First of all, by placing the power to 
assert or waive the privilege in the hands of the 
government, the value of the privilege in promoting 
unhindered communication would be undermined. Because 
those who would benefit from the privilege would lack the 
power to control its application, they would be less able to 
rely on its protection when deciding whether to provide 
sensitive information. "An uncertain privilege . . . is little 
better than no privilege at all." Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 
(quoting Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)); 
see also In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1153-54 (noting the 
problems that would be created in allowing a parent to 
assert or waive a privilege created to protect the interests of 
a child). To the extent that the value of a privilege is thus 
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weakened, it is that much less able to overcome the value 
of promoting the availability of probative evidence. 16 
 
Furthermore, the variety--both in kind and in magnitude 
--of the interests at stake calls for a more flexible approach 
than that possible with a Rule 501 privilege. For such a 
privilege would effectively grant to the state--or, more 
precisely, to a congeries of state and municipal agencies-- 
the power to withhold, or make available, an entire class of 
documents regardless of the particular complexities of the 
case. The resolution of discovery disputes of the sort 
presented in the case at bar would be best served by an 
approach that allowed the potentially wide variety of 
interests at stake to be incorporated into a solution 
balancing the need to protect sensitive information with the 
need to make relevant material available. Because the 
interests on both sides have the potential to be so very 
significant, it is especially important to define the scope of 
the release of information very carefully. And it seems 
unreasonable to expect that a government agency, in the 
midst of litigation, would be best placed to determine 
whether and to what extent sensitive information should be 
released. In short, a Rule 501 evidentiary privilege held by 
the government would be an unacceptably imprecise tool 
for the protection of a broad and varied landscape of 
interests. And given the fact that, as we discuss in the next 
subsection, a more precise and better located tool is 
available for that purpose, there is little reason to adopt 
such a problematic device. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. We note that while separation of the privilege holder from the 
interested party substantially undermines the value of the privilege, such 
a separation is not always fatal to a privilege's recognition. The 
informer's privilege, for instance, is designed in large part to protect 
the 
privacy interests of the informer. It is held, however, by the government, 
which may freely waive it notwithstanding the desires of the informer. 
See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957) ("What is usually 
referred to as the informer's privilege is in reality the Government's 
privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish 
information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of 
that law."). Once the government reveals the identity of the informer, the 
privilege is waived. Id. at 60. Because of the inherent difficulties with 
such bifurcated privileges, however, they are very rare indeed. 
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In sum, we find that Rule 501 is unsuited for the kind of 
privilege that appellants have requested: one that maintains 
its protection despite the express waiver of the primary 
holder of interests in confidentiality. Given the caution with 
which federal courts are to approach all questions of novel 
privileges, we have little trouble rejecting any such 
privilege. 
 
c. 
 
Our rejection of appellants' requested privilege under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 should not be taken to 
amount to a determination that the unhindered release of 
the information here in dispute is appropriate. On the 
contrary, district courts have the power, under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 26(c), to issue protective orders 
constraining--in any of a variety of ways--the release of 
sensitive information. Given the potential weight of the 
considerations in favor of confidentiality of the information 
here in dispute, the present case is a good candidate for a 
thorough and conscientious assessment of the various 
considerations for and against confidentiality. 
 
Rule 26(c) empowers the court to issue protective orders 
"which justice requires to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden 
or expense." Legitimate interests in privacy are among the 
proper subjects of this provision's protection."It is 
appropriate for courts to order confidentiality to prevent the 
infliction of unnecessary or serious pain on parties who the 
court reasonably finds are entitled to such protection." 
Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3d Cir. 
1994). Such an order is only appropriate, however, where 
the party seeking the order "show[s] good cause by 
demonstrating a particular need for protection." Id. To 
make a showing of good cause, the party seeking 
confidentiality has the burden of showing the injury "with 
specificity." Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 
1071 (3d Cir. 1984). The injury shown, however, need be no 
more than "embarrassment"; thus, a party need not 
establish a monetizable injury. See Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986). Further, in 
appropriate circumstances, a district court is empowered to 
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issue umbrella protective orders protecting classes of 
documents after a threshold showing by the party seeking 
protection. See id. at 1122. 
 
Rule 26(c) further provides that such orders may be 
crafted to create any of a broad range of requirements, 
including 
 
       (1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had; (2) that 
       the disclosure or discovery may be had only on 
       specified terms and conditions, including a designation 
       of time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only 
       by a method of discovery other than that selected by 
       the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not 
       be inquired into, or that the scope of the disclosure or 
       discovery be limited to certain matters; [and] (5) that 
       discovery be conducted with no one present except 
       persons designated by the court . . . . 
 
Thus, Rule 26(c) provides district courts with the power 
to formulate a detailed solution that reflects the concerns of 
particular individual disputes. To that extent, it provides a 
superior mechanism for the resolution of the present 
dispute than does Federal Rule of Evidence 501. 
 
The District Court order appealed from in this case 
contains some restrictions of the kind authorized by Rule 
26(c). In particular, the District Court ordered that certain 
identifying characteristics be redacted from certainfiles, 
that certain files not be viewed by plaintiff 's attorneys, and 
that all documents received by plaintiff be kept confidential. 
See supra, note 5. It is clear from the language of that 
order, however, that it represents an attempt to permit 
discovery to the extent possible consistent with the District 
Court's view of the restrictions created by the Pennsylvania 
statutes.17 A more apt approach to the resolution of this 
dispute would focus less on the letter of the Pennsylvania 
statutes than on an accommodation of plaintiff 's legitimate 
discovery interests with the legitimate interests of third 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. One of the three restrictions imposed by the District Court begins, 
"In accordance with section 6307(2) of the Juvenile Act," and another 
purports to be imposed "[p]ursuant to 55 Pa. Code S 3680.35(b)(5)." See 
supra, note 5. 
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parties in the confidentiality of portions of the requested 
material. 
 
The flexibility of Rule 26 also allows the court to take into 
account the particular needs of the parties at the present 
stage of litigation, a consideration that we view as 
appropriate in this case. We note that the needs of 
appellant at this stage are relatively modest. As counsel for 
Ms. Pearson acknowledged at oral argument, her attorneys 
are simply interested in developing her case, and would not 
object to an order that, for instance, prevented anyone 
other than counsel from viewing or learning the contents of 
any of the material sought. Such a restriction seems 
entirely sensible at this point, since any restrictions that 
would (a) further legitimate interests in confidentiality, but 
(b) would not interfere with appellee's needs at this early 
stage, would be appropriate. Indeed, in view of the 
considerable significance of the interests in confidentiality 
here at stake, it would appear proper for the District Court 
to permit no greater release of the information sought by 
appellee than is absolutely necessary for the particular 
purposes for which it is sought. The parties may later seek 
to modify the order as appropriate at a later stage. See 
Pansy, 23 F.3d at 784 ("It is well-established that a district 
court retains the power to modify or lift confidentiality 
orders that it has entered."). 
 
Accordingly, we reject appellants' request for the federal 
recognition of one or more evidentiary privileges derived 
from the Pennsylvania confidentiality provisions under 
which appellants have sought protection from discovery. We 
will vacate the order of the District Court, however, for 
reconsideration of the present discovery dispute in the light 
of this opinion. Because the District Court placed 
conditions upon discovery pursuant to inapplicable 
Pennsylvania law, we will direct the District Court to modify 
its discovery order to remove any conditions that were 
imposed solely to conform to state law. At that time, the 
District Court should entertain requests for protective 
orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) and 
impose such restrictions upon discovery as it deems 
appropriate. 
 
                                26 
  
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                27 
